Genghis Khan has always seemed to me a prime example of Realpolitik despite never being associated as such. Not only in the organization of the army, legal system and carriers, but in overall military decisions. The Mongolians were very few in number, riding into faraway lands. When they took over a Muslim city they couldn’t hope t hold on to it during the campaign, which is why they razed it to the ground and murdered the inhabitants. Machiavelli addresses this issue, saying that the conquer needs to either move in the conquered city or have mass migration to it to prevent an organized revolt. But when this was possible (specially after the war was one) he did exactly that. If you contrast the Mongolians with their civilized antagonists you can tell that it was living in a harsh conditions that made them supreme realists. The Mongolians told Genghis Khan as a child that they were nomads as a matter of defense, for if they had a hold out then their enemies would be able to find them and conquer them. They had told be socially savvy, for survival dependent on alliances and rooting out traitors. The civilized antagonists had their writing and organized education that told them how the world was, and filled them with superstition.
The Mongolians saw the world in fresh eyes. They didn’t necessarily have preconceptions of how the world operated to the degree of the civilized nations they conquered, but where able to see the causes and effects in a complex world in ways their foes didn’t.
When going to war with the Mohammedans, Genghis Khan wrote that they had chosen war, and the outcome of it was unknown and either one was capable of victory. He seemed to have a realistic sense of his strength throughout his military campaigns and attacked and retreated depending on the situation. He also spared citizens or murdered them based on these same calculated cause and effect decisions. The Mohammedans on the other hand seemed secure of their success at the beginning of the campaign. While the Spartans were famous for not retreating (which was necessary for the shock warfare with phalanx that the Greeks engaged in as opposed to the mobile warfare of Mongolian cavalry archers) it’s attitudes in general are very similar to those Thucydides wrote that the king of Sparta Lacedaemonians stated when saying “In practice we always base our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that his plans are good; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes not on a belief in his blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions.” It’s worth to quote in full:
“And the slowness and procrastination, the parts of our character that are most assailed by their criticism, need not make you blush. If we undertake the war without preparation, we should by hastening its commencement only delay its conclusion: further, a free and a famous city has through all time been ours. The quality which they condemn is really nothing but a wise moderation; thanks to its possession, we alone do not become insolent in success and give way less than others in misfortune; we are not carried away by the pleasure of hearing ourselves cheered on to risks which our judgment condemns; nor, if annoyed, are we any the more convinced by attempts to exasperate us by accusation. We are both warlike and wise, and it is our sense of order that makes us so. We are warlike, because self-control contains honour as a chief constituent, and honour bravery. And we are wise, because we are educated with too little learning to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to disobey them, and are brought up not to be too knowing in useless matters- such as the knowledge which can give a specious criticism of an enemy’s plans in theory, but fails to assail them with equal success in practice- but are taught to consider that the schemes of our enemies are not dissimilar to our own, and that the freaks of chance are not determinable by calculation. In practice we always base our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that his plans are good; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes not on a belief in his blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions. Nor ought we to believe that there is much difference between man and man, but to think that the superiority lies with him who is reared in the severest school. These practices, then, which our ancestors have delivered to us, and by whose maintenance we have always profited, must not be given up. And we must not be hurried into deciding in a day’s brief space a question which concerns many lives and fortunes and many cities, and in which honour is deeply involved- but we must decide calmly. This our strength peculiarly enables us to do. As for the Athenians, send to them on the matter of Potidaea, send on the matter of the alleged wrongs of the allies, particularly as they are prepared with legal satisfaction; and to proceed against one who offers arbitration as against a wrongdoer, law forbids. Meanwhile do not omit preparation for war. This decision will be the best for yourselves, the most terrible to your opponents.”
It’s odd to describe, but it’s as if these pagans had a realistic perception of failure and this was attributed in part to their cunning, will power, masculinity and luck. They had a sense of destiny, but this would only accomplish itself as long as they did a good job. They neither had this modern “learn from your mistakes” nonsense we moderns have. While there is safe to fail situations where learning is very useful, there are many other situations where failing can be a disaster for either your career or life. Instead of being laser focused on reality and trying to understand reality in order to correctly act on it, the modern “learn from your mistakes” just brushes off failures because they’re stepping stones to a big success success coming up. They cherry pick examples of past successes to make them believe this will happen to them, as if it was a general pattern and not an exception. They downplay the consequences of failure and as a result are defeated by not engaging in the level they should.
The same happens from an overestimation of your strength, or the assumption that a competition will be easy. Same can be said from the opposite, where you are capable of more than you realize and you fail to capitalize on your strength and go all the way. A keen eye on reality. The Mongolians where able to successfully do this, at least Genghis Khan did since the Mongolians didn’t become much after three generations or so with the exception of Tamerlane, or they merged into the conquered regions they lived in by cultural absorption and intermarriage. In any case, what Genghis Khan did in terms of system thinking by its unification of the nomad clans under him, his military training with the great hunts, its military tactics and strategies, carrier system and administration of conquered lands was genius. He didn’t read that from books, or the educated idiot savants he conquered and made use of (with some exceptions of course, but the overall grand picture was the Mongolians, and they knew when to make use and discard the advice from their advisers administrating some of their providences).